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Abstract:  
Tax increment financing (TIF) has been a popular and controversial economic development tool 
for several decades. This research considers the determinants of competitive dynamics, equity, and 
path dependency on TIF use. We use logistic and ordinary least squares regressions on the 
approval, number, and value of TIFs in Missouri to flesh out the way the determinants contribute 
to TIF approval, value, and frequency of use. This study finds that there are competitive dynamics 
that affect TIF use: being adjacent to another city that uses TIFs increases the likelihood that a city 
will approve a TIF. The study finds evidence that TIF adoption patterns contribute to 
intermunicipal inequality, and provides some support for the importance of path dependency on 
TIF use.  
 
Despite protracted debate, substantial disagreement persists regarding the use of state and local development 
incentives such as tax increment financing (TIF). Peters and Fisher (2004) argue that the case for incentives is 
unproven at best. Nevertheless, government officials continue to use them, which Schwartz, Pelzman, and Keren 
(2008) term “a riddle.” U.S. state and local governments are estimated to spend about $50 billion annually on 
development incentives (Peters & Fisher, 2004; Thomas, 2000). If governments adopt TIF and other incentives 
because nearby jurisdictions do so (Li, 2006), this could explain the disjuncture between theory and policy. 
Identifying the existence of competitive dynamics in the adoption of TIF, tax abatement, or other incentives can help 
us solve this conundrum. 
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The patterns of incentive adoption may also run counter to the claimed purposes of incentive programs, such as 
reducing blight (Gordon, 2008). Recent evidence (Reese, 2006) has shown a continuing tendency for programs to 
exacerbate inequalities between municipalities, or at least not reduce them. One reason for this, Reese argues, is that 
a process of path dependency has taken place. Prosperous cities were the first to adopt such incentives, and 
familiarity with particular programs has led these cities to continue to adopt the programs more frequently over time 
compared to poorer municipalities. She showed that this process characterized Michigan’s PA 198 tax abatement 
program and created a dynamic of worsening inequality. Using new data generated from the Missouri TIF program, 
we perform a preliminary analysis of determinants to understand more about competitive dynamics, equity, and path 
dependency. We find significant evidence of competitive dynamics, no positive and some evidence of negative 
equity effects, and results partially supportive of earlier findings regarding path dependency. 
 
The article begins with a review of the literature on investment incentives generally and TIF in particular, with an 
emphasis on quantitative studies from the international to the local level. We then discuss the procedures and 
methods used in the study and present an analysis of the results. In the conclusion, we consider policy implications 
and directions for further research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Man (2001) defines TIF as “a geographically targeted tax, expenditure, and regulatory inducement to a specific 
location” that works by using “taxes derived from the increases in assessed values (the tax increment) resulting from 
new development . . . to pay for infrastructure needs and development expenditures in the TIF district” (p. 1). This 
highlights the relevance of the wider literature on investment incentives to the discussion of TIF. Our discussion 
draws broadly on this literature and is grouped according to the three main themes of the article: competitive 
dynamics, equity, and path dependency. 
 
Capital Mobility and Competitive Dynamics 
  
The mobility of capital between jurisdictions underlies competition for investment among governments (Thomas, 
2000). Research at the international level and within the United States finds evidence of the importance of capital 
mobility and the existence of competitive dynamics in the use of investment incentives. Aydin (2007) found for EU 
countries that the higher the ratio of mobile asset holders (such as manufacturing and finance) to immobile asset 
holders (such as mining, farming, nonfinancial services, and retail) within a country, the more state aid (i.e., 
subsidies) was given as a percentage of government revenue. Similarly, countries with a higher ratio of mobile to 
immobile asset holders provided a higher percentage of regional aid as a share of total state aid, implying that 
mobile asset holders were successful in extracting investment incentives because regional aid is the primary 
category used for investment incentives (see Wishlade, 2008). Moreover, Aydin found that for U.S. states, the 
higher the contribution of mobile asset holders to gross state product, the greater the number of types of incentive 
programs as measured in the Conway Data annual surveys. Li (2006) also found that developing countries adopt tax 
incentives when nearby countries do so. Studies of local TIF use have also found evidence of competitive dynamics 
among municipalities. Man (1999) found this in Indiana, with the adoption of TIF by neighboring cities increasing 
the likelihood of TIF adoption. Byrne (2005) found that TIF adoption by nearby suburbs increased a city’s 
likelihood of adopting TIF in the Chicago metropolitan area. One issue that needs clarification is whether adjacency 
or distance is a better predictor of competitive dynamics. 
 
Equity 
 
One key issue in the policy evaluation of TIF or other investment incentives is whether they reduce existing 
inequalities between individuals and cities or in fact exacerbate them (Peters & Fisher, 2004). Three variables can be 
considered here: poverty, per capita income, and unemployment.1 Prior research has not established a link between 
poverty rates and TIF or tax abatement adoption (Anderson & Wassmer, 1995; Dye & Merriman, 2000), suggesting 
that TIF has not helped reduce intermunicipal inequality in Michigan or Illinois, though neither has it exacerbated 
inequality. Reese (2006) found no link between a city’s classification as “distressed” and its use of PA 198 
abatements after controlling for past abatement use. On the other hand, Man (1999) found that cities with higher per 
capita income were less likely to use TIF, whereas Anderson and Wassmer found that cities with higher median 
household income had longer periods without using tax abatement than lower income cities did. The results for the 
The final, definitive version of this paper has been published in the Economic Development Quarterly, Vol  24 (Iss 2), 2010.   
SAGE Publications, Inc., All rights reserved. doi: 10.1177/0891242409358080 
 
 
3 
effect of unemployment on investment incentives are more mixed. U.S. states with higher unemployment rates tend 
to have fewer types of subsidy programs, and European Union Member States also see a negative impact of 
unemployment on total state aid (Aydin, 2007). Other studies find no effect (Man, 1999). 
 
Path Dependency  
 
Reese (2006) argues strongly for the importance of path dependency in the use of tax abatements in Michigan. In her 
analysis, cities that used abatements early in the history of Michigan’s PA 198 were likely to continue using them 
over time. Moreover, when she added this variable to what she calls “traditional” determinants, it greatly improved 
the explanatory power of the equations, whether the dependent variable was the number of abatements granted or 
the total value of the abatements. Her conclusion is that this pattern, one in which prosperous suburbs gave early and 
often, has caused the abatement process to exacerbate inequalities between municipalities, which is relevant to this 
study’s concern with the existence of both path dependency and equity. 
 
Controls 
 
Though not the focus of this article, other potential determinants of TIF use that have been identified in other studies 
are also incorporated as control variables in our analysis. These include population and population growth 
(Anderson, 1990; Dye & Merriman, 2000; Reese, 2006), percentage of owner-occupied housing (Byrne, 2005), 
government structure (Reese, 2006), having an economic development plan (Reese, 2006), and the use of other 
economic development tools (Man, 1999). 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Research Questions 
 
Three questions are addressed in this research: 
1) Do cities use TIF to compete with other cities for investment? If so, then we would expect to find that 
being adjacent to a city using TIF will increase the likelihood of adoption of TIF, the likelihood of adoption of retail 
TIF, and the number and value of all TIFs and retail TIFs, while distance from the nearest city using TIF will 
decrease likelihood of adoption, number, and value.  
2) Does the pattern of TIF usage in Missouri ameliorate or exacerbate inequality between municipalities? If 
the former is true, the poverty rate and unemployment rate should be positively related to the dependent variables, 
while median household income should be negatively related to them. The opposite results should occur if TIF 
usage is exacerbating inequality. There may, of course, be no effect. 
3) Is TIF usage in Missouri path dependent? If so, we would expect to find that early adopters of TIF have 
awarded a greater number of TIFs and a larger amount of TIF funding. 
 
 Research Design 
 
A mailing list of 236 cities in Missouri was assembled by combining a list provided by the Missouri Department of 
Economic Development with a published listing of contacts for all U.S. cities with populations above 2,500 
(International City/County Management Association [ICMA], 2006). A survey (see Appendix A) was sent to the 
cities in the spring of 2008. Reminder postcards were mailed approximately three weeks later. A second mailing of 
the survey was sent to cities that had not responded, followed by telephone calls to city officials to conduct the 
survey by phone. The survey questions were modeled from surveys previously used by Reese (2001, 2006) in her 
research on Michigan tax abatements. Additional data on government structure were drawn from the ICMA 2006 
Municipal Year Book. Data on population, income, owner-occupied housing, unemployment, and poverty were 
taken from the 2000 U.S. Census (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). Data on the assessed value of property in each 
municipality in 1985 and 2005 (to obtain the change in values) were obtained from reports from the State Auditor of 
Missouri (1986, 2005). Early TIF adopters were identified through a compilation of individual projects reported in 
the annual reports on local TIF from the Missouri Department of Economic Development (2004, 2005). 
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Population 
 
Since the dynamics of core cities are different from their much smaller suburbs (Dye & Merriman, 2000), St. Louis 
and Kansas City were not included. Cities with less than 2,500 in population were also not included in the model, 
resulting in a total of 185 cities for study, of which 171 (92%) responded to the survey  
 
Measures 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
Six models were run with different dependent variables. As seen in Table 2, each dependent variable was taken 
directly from the survey responses to the questions. The first dependent variable is a categorical variable indicating 
whether or not the city has ever approved a TIF. The second dependent variable is the number of TIFs adopted by 
the city. The third dependent variable is the value of all TIFs awarded by the city. The fourth dependent variable is 
whether or not the city approved a TIF for a primarily retail development. The fifth dependent variable is the 
number of retail TIFs adopted. The sixth dependent variable is the value of TIFs awarded for retail development. 
 
Independent Variables 
 
The independent variables related to competitive dynamics were constructed using geographic information system 
(GIS) software and data (Geolytics, Inc., 2000). The first is a dummy variable indicating whether or not the city is 
adjacent to another city that used TIF. The second is the distance to the nearest city that used TIF. The inequality 
variables (poverty rate, unemployment rate, and median household income) were taken from the 2000 U.S. Census. 
Early adoption was operationalized as having approved TIF before 1993, based on data from the Department of 
Economic Development’s annual reports. The controls include three dummy variables, indicating council-manager 
government type (as opposed to mayor or commissioner), whether or not the city has an economic development 
plan, and whether or not the city uses other economic development tools. Interval level controls for population, 
population growth, and owner-occupied housing come from the 2000 U.S. Census, and the interval level control for 
average growth rates of assessed value of property from 1985-2005 come from the Missouri state auditor’s office. 
Table 1 describes the variables in the model and Table 2 lists all the variables and their sources.  
 
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about Here] 
 
As seen in Table 3 the survey data reveal that 56% of cities used TIF and the average total amount awarded by cities 
was $12.7 million.2 The total amount of TIF awarded throughout Missouri by these cities was $1.7 billion. Although 
not noted in the table, of the 204 TIFs awarded, 116 were reported as “primarily retail” and the total amount of TIF 
awarded that was primarily retail was $1.1 billion. As noted in the table, the average retail TIF awarded was $7.7 
million.3 Forty-three percent of cities had a council-manager government. A majority of cities (74%) reported 
having an economic development plan, with 52% of those indicating it is a formal and written plan. Sixty-seven 
percent of cities reported using other economic development tools. The most frequently reported tools were 
transportation development districts, community and neighborhood improvement districts, and empowerment zones. 
Additional economic and city demographic data for the cities are provided in the table. Table 3 reveals several 
statistically significant correlations but none that are likely to create multicollinearity problems in the analysis. 
Although there is a high correlation (-.739) between adjacency and distance to a city that uses TIF, these variables 
are never used in the same model.  
 
[Insert Table 3 and Table 4 about Here] 
 
Methods 
   
Fourteen models were analyzed. Four binomial logistic regressions were estimated to assess the effect of the 
previously noted factors on the likelihood of a city (a) approving a TIF or (b) approving a TIF primarily for retail. 
Two regressions use adjacency to a city using TIF as the measure of competitive dynamics, while the other two use 
distance to the nearest city using TIF. The odds ratios in Table 5 indicate the likelihood of TIF approval for each 
variable that was statistically significant. An odds ratio greater than 1 indicates an increased likelihood that a one-
unit change in the independent variable increases the odds of TIF approval by 1 minus the odds ratio figure. An odds 
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ratio of less than 1 indicates a decrease in the odds for each one-unit change in the independent variable by 1 minus 
the odds ratio number. A negative sign before the odds ratio indicates that for an increase in the independent 
variable by one unit, the dependent variable would decrease by the odds ratio.  
  
Ten ordinary least squares regression analyses are reported in Table 6. As in Table 5, the regressions are split up by 
the two alternative measures of competitive dynamics. The first four are on the dependent variable number of TIFs. 
Two of these regressions are reported using the variable early adopter, to test the effect of path dependency. Early 
adopter was only significant in these two equations, and hence the only time it is reported is in Table 6. Two 
regressions are reported for the dependent variable number of retail TIFs. Then four regressions, two each on value 
of all TIFs and value of retail TIFs, are reported.  
 
Findings 
 
The first logit model in Table 5 reveals that being a city adjacent to another city that has approved a TIF makes a 
city 1.63 times more likely to approve a TIF. Table 5 also reveals that for each 1% increase in the poverty rate the 
likelihood of approving a TIF decreases by 9%. In addition, the first model shows that having an economic 
development plan and using other economic development tools both increase the likelihood of a city approving a 
TIF. Cities that have an economic development plan are nearly twice as likely to approve a TIF. Cities that use other 
economic development tools are 1.74 times more likely to approve a TIF project than cities that do not use other 
tools. In the second model in Table 5, including the variable that calculates the miles to the nearest city with a TIF 
shows that although this variable is not significant, taking this factor into account strengthens the decrease in 
likelihood of TIF adoption due to poverty, with a 1% increase in the poverty rate now causing an 11% decrease as 
opposed to 9% in the first equation. Unemployment is significant in this model: for every 1% increase in the 
unemployment rate, the odds of TIF approval go up by nearly 50%. In this model, the effects of having an economic 
development plan and experience with other economic development tools are reduced compared with the first 
model. Additionally, this model reveals an effect for population: For every 1,000-person increase in the city’s 
population the likelihood of TIF approval increases by 4%.   
 
Table 5 also reveals that not all the same factors are at work when considering approval of TIFs that primarily foster 
retail development. Being adjacent to a city that has approved a TIF increases makes a city almost twice as likely to 
approve a TIF for retail development. For every 1% increase in the unemployment rate the odds of TIF approval go 
up by nearly 65%. The use of other economic development tools increases the likelihood of approving a TIF by 
more than three times. Additionally, for every 1,000-person increase in city population the likelihood of TIF 
approval increases by 3%. When considering the model that includes miles to the nearest city that uses a TIF rather 
than adjacency to a TIF city, for every 1% increase in the poverty rate there is a decrease of 13% in the odds of a 
retail TIF being approved. The effect of unemployment and population are slightly stronger in terms of increasing 
the odds of TIF approval for retail development, while the use of other economic development tools has a slightly 
weaker impact than in the third equation.   
 
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
  
As seen in the first two regression equations in Table 6, there is virtually no difference between the model with 
adjacency to a TIF city and the model with the variable for miles to the nearest city that approved a TIF. In both 
cases, only economic development plans and population are statistically significant in relation to increasing the 
number of TIFs approved. The one notable difference is that adjacency, but not miles, is statistically significant. 
Being adjacent to a city with a TIF increases the number of TIFs approved by 1.01 TIFs. Having an economic 
development plan increases the number of TIFs approved by 0.68 of a TIF, and a 1,000-person increase in 
population increases the number of TIFs approved by 0.03 of a TIF. The next two equations in Table 6 include the 
variable early adopter and its impact on increasing the number of TIFs approved. As can be seen, the inclusion of 
this variable substantially increases the adjusted R2, from .21 in Equation 1 to .37 in Equation 3, and from .16 in 
Equation 2 to .33 in Equation 4. The effect of adjacency to a TIF city increases the number of TIFs approved by 0.82 
of a TIF, while the effect of being an early adopter of TIF as an economic development tool increases the number of 
TIFs adopted by 3.62 TIFs in Equation 3. The impact is even greater in Equation 4, where being an early adopter 
increases the number of TIFs approved by 3.81 TIFs, although distance to the nearest TIF, unlike adjacency, is not 
significant. In both models, a population increase of 1,000 people increases the number of TIFs approved by 0.03 of 
a TIF, while the effect of having an economic development plan is no longer significant. In the next two models in 
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Table 6, the only factor that is significant in both of the models predicting retail TIF use is population. For every 
1,000-person increase in the population of a city the number of retail TIFs increases by 0.02 of a TIF. In the model 
with the variable adjacent to TIF city, adjacency predicts an increase in the number of retail TIFs by 0.56 of a TIF.  
 
Table 6 reveals that across all models the only variable that consistently predicts the value of a TIF is population. 
The value of all TIFs increases by approximately $630,000 for each 1,000-person increase in a city’s population. In 
the models for the value of retail TIF a 1,000-person population increase in a city increases the value of the retail 
TIF by approximately $468,000. In both models on retail TIFs, adjacency and miles to the nearest city with a TIF 
are not significant. However, the use of other economic development tools and the percent of owner-occupied 
housing are statistically significant in the retail TIF model. A city’s use of other economic development tools 
increases the total value of retail TIF by approximately $8.85 million. Additionally, for each percentage increase in a 
city’s owner-occupied housing, the total value of retail TIF increases by approximately $360,000. Across all the 
models, adjacency gives a better fit than distance, suggesting that adjacency is a better predictor than distance of 
competitive dynamics. Therefore, our preferred specifications are Equations 1 and 3 in Table 5, and Equations 1, 3, 
5, 7, and 9 in Table 6. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In our preferred specifications the models show substantial evidence of competitive dynamics. The adoption of TIF 
by a neighboring municipality made a city more than two and half times as likely to adopt any TIF, and almost 
tripled its likelihood of adopting a retail TIF. This indicates that Missouri cities use TIF to compete with other cities 
for investment. Moreover, we found some evidence that TIF adoption patterns contribute to intermunicipal 
inequality. Cities in Missouri with higher poverty rates were less likely to adopt TIF than those with lower poverty 
rates, and median household income was never statistically significant. These outcomes indicate a failure of TIF to 
combat existing inequality. Evidence was mixed on whether cities with higher unemployment rates were more likely 
to adopt TIF. In our preferred specifications, unemployment was significant for adoption of retail TIF, but not for 
adoption of all TIFs or for the number or value of all TIFs and retail TIFs. Finally, we find some support for Reese 
(2006) on the importance of path dependency, as cities which were early adopters of TIF (1987-1992) adopted 3.62 
more TIFs and 3.81 more retail TIFs, controlling for other factors. However, there was no evidence that early 
adopters made larger cumulative TIF awards than other cities. 
 
Among the control variables, the most consistently significant independent variable was population, which was 
positive and significant in all but one of the preferred specifications. Other factors, such as having an economic 
development plan and experience with other economic development tools, not surprisingly were significant when it 
came to predicting TIF approval. Having an economic development plan also had a positive impact on the number 
of TIFs approved, but that effect dropped out after controlling for early adopters. A city’s use of other economic 
development tools had a substantial impact on the value of retail TIFs in Missouri. Contrary to Byrne’s findings, we 
find that owner-occupied housing is only significant in determining the value of retail TIFs. Government structure 
and change in total assessed value were not statistically significant in any of the models, the latter of which is 
contrary to Anderson’s (1990) and Reese’s (2006) findings. 
    
Policy Implications and Future Research 
 
The strong impact of adjacency on TIF adoption may help explain why so many jurisdictions adopt development 
incentives despite what Peters and Fisher (2004) describe as a lack of strong evidence for their efficacy and 
efficiency. As noted earlier, Man (1999), Byrne (2005), and Li (2006) all found evidence that governments reacted 
to the adoption of incentives by other jurisdictions. An even stronger finding would be that failure to use incentives 
causes the loss of investment, not merely that governments react to other governments’ use of incentives (Guisinger, 
1985). Some evidence for this exists both within the United States (Head, Ries, & Swenson, 1999) and at the 
international level (Harding & Javorcik, 2007). Additional research at the municipal level would increase our 
understanding of this issue. The policy implication of such a finding might be that it would be desirable for 
governments to cooperate to reduce their use of incentives to increase efficiency and equity. This type of 
coordination has been implemented, for example, by the European Union (Albornoz & Corcos, 2007; Barros & 
Cabral, 2000).  
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By partly supporting Reese’s (2006) finding of the importance of path dependency, this work strengthens the case 
for better targeting of incentives. As Reese argues, the combination of untargeted incentives and path dependency is 
a recipe for incentive programs to exacerbate intermunicipal inequality. Despite evidence that it is difficult to sustain 
such targeting either in the U.S. Empowerment Zone program or under European Union Structural Funds 
(Greenbaum & Bondonio, 2004), the weight of the evidence reviewed and presented here suggests that it is a 
desirable policy goal. 
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TABLE 1 
Variables in the Models 
 
Dependent 
Variables 
Competitive Equity Path 
Dependency 
Controls 
TIF Approval Adjacent to City 
with TIF 
Poverty Rate Early 
Adopter 
Council-
Manager 
Government 
Retail TIF 
Approval 
Miles to Nearest 
City with TIF 
Unemployment Rate  Economic 
Development 
Plan 
Number of All 
TIFs 
 Median Household 
Income 
 Uses other 
Economic 
Development 
Tools 
Number of Retail 
TIFs 
   Population in 
thousands 
Value of All TIFs 
($) 
   Population 
Growth (1980 
to 2000) 
Value of Retail 
TIFs ($) 
   Percent Owner-
Occupied 
Housing 
    Change in 
Total Assessed 
Property Value 
(1985-2005) 
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Table 2 
Variables, Measurement, and Source 
Variable Measurement Source 
 
TIF Approval 
 
Nominal 
 
Survey Response  
 
Retail TIF Approval 
 
Nominal 
 
Survey Response  
Number of All TIFs Interval Survey Response  
Number of Retail TIFs Interval Survey Response  
 
Value of All TIFs  
 
Interval 
 
Survey Response  
 
Value of Retail TIFs  
 
Interval 
 
Survey Response  
Council-Manager Government Nominal ICMA 
Economic Development Plan Nominal Survey Response 
Uses other Economic 
Development Tools 
 
Nominal 
Survey Response 
Adjacent to City with TIF Nominal Geolytics 
Miles to Nearest City with TIF Interval Geolytics 
Early Adopter Nominal Missouri Dept. of Economic 
Development 
Population in thousands Interval U.S. Census 
Population Growth (1980 to 
2000) 
 
Interval 
 
U.S. Census 
Percent Owner-Occupied 
Housing 
 
Ratio 
 
U.S. Census 
Poverty Rate Ratio U.S. Census 
Unemployment Rate Ratio U.S. Census 
Change in Total Assessed 
Property Value (1985-2005) 
Ratio State Auditor of Missouri 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard  
Deviation 
N 
TIF Approval .56 .50 171 
Number of TIFs 1.24 1.85 165 
Value of All TIFs 12,700,000 28,000,000 134 
Retail TIF Approval .42 .50 163 
Number of Retail TIFs .73 1.14 160 
Value of all Retail TIFs 7,691,851 19,300,000 141 
Council-Manager Government .43 .50 185 
Economic Development Plan .74 .44 155 
Uses other Economic Development Tools .67 .47 171 
Early Adopter .05 .22 185 
Population 12,957 18,587 185 
Population Growth from 1980-2000 .55 2.72 181 
Percent of Owner-Occupied Housing 67 12 185 
Median Household Income  40,158 21,124 185 
Poverty Rate 10.08 7.50 185 
Unemployment Rate 3.31 1.62 185 
Average Growth Rate in Total Assessed 
Property Value (1985-2005) 
 
2.6 
 
6.5 
 
175 
Adjacent to City with TIF .41 .49 180 
Miles from City with TIF 12 14 182 
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TABLE 4 
Bivariate Correlations 
 TIF 
Appro-
val 
Num-
ber of 
all 
TIFs 
Value 
of all 
TIFs 
Retail 
TIF 
Approv
al 
Num-
ber of 
Retail 
TIFs 
Value 
of 
Retail 
TIFs 
Council- 
Manager 
ED 
Plan 
Other 
Tools 
Pop-
ulation 
Pop-
ulation 
Growth 
1980-
2000 
Owner-
Occup- 
ied 
Hous-
ing 
Median 
Income 
Pov-
erty 
Rate 
Un-
employ
-ment 
Rate 
Average 
Growth 
1985-
2005 
Adja-
cent 
To TIF 
City 
Miles  
Near-
est 
TIF 
City 
Early  
Adop
ter 
TIF 
Approval 
1                   
Number 
of all 
TIFs 
.613** 1                  
Value of 
all TIFs  
.514** .714** 1                 
Retail 
TIF 
Approval 
.791** .574* .511** 1                
Number 
of Retail 
TIF 
.593** .748** .655** .753** 1               
Value of 
Retail 
TIFs 
.421** .587** .794** .549** .747** 1              
Council-
Manager 
.069 .144 .064 .063 .139 -.047 1             
ED Plan .172* .162 .126 .096 .139 .129 .104 1            
Other 
Tools 
.312** .229** .210* .366** .270** .234** .119 .115 1           
Pop-
ulation 
.257* .363** .475** .251** .324** .313** .294** .143 .176* 1          
Pop-
ulation 
Growth 
1980-
2000 
-.041 -.033 -.035 -.046 -.051 -.035 -.048 -.110 .116 -.002 1         
Owner-
Occupied 
Housing 
.038 .011 .026 .130 .107 .109 -.086 -.140 .071 -.005 .187* 1        
Median 
Income 
.108 .073 .074 .126 .099 .071 -.037 -.134 .112 .096 .261** .668** 1       
Poverty 
Rate 
-.213** -.119 -.036 -.222** -.184* -.131 -.023 .054 -.336** -.161* -.167* -.488** -.589** 1 
 
     
Un-
employ-
ment 
Rate 
-.035 -.039 .003 -.018 -.062 .026 -.117 .041 -.204** -.037 .129 -.403** -.424** .456** 1     
Average 
Growth 
1985-
.090 .003 -.020 .055 -.007 -008 -.048 .116 -.026 -.002 .111 .240** .214** -.198** -.155* 1    
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2005 
TIF 
Appro-
val 
Num-
ber of 
all TIFs 
Value 
of all 
TIFs 
Retail 
TIF 
Approv
al 
Num-
ber of 
Retail 
TIFs 
Value 
of 
Retail 
TIFs 
Counci
l -
Manag
er 
ED Plan Other 
Tools 
Pop-
ulation 
Pop-
ulation 
Growth 
1980-
2000 
Owner-
Occup- 
ied 
Hous-
ing 
Median 
Income 
Poverty 
Rate 
Un-
employ
-ment 
Rate 
Averag
e 
Growt
h 
1985-
2005 
Adja-
cent 
To TIF 
City 
Miles  
Near-
est 
TIF 
City 
Early  
Adop
ter 
 
Adjacent 
To TIF 
City 
.273** .287** .121 .322** .301** .105 -.069 -.072 .083 .130 .120 .346** .500** -.341** -.096 .118 1   
Miles  
Nearest 
TIF City 
-.120 -.124 -.081 -.128* -.172* -.054 .092 .057 -.150* -.120 -.115 -.348** -.455** .418** .126 -.125 -.739** 1  
Early 
Adopter 
.196* .431** .087 .093 .157* .035* .107 .140 .125 .167* .058 -.015 .025 -.090 -.087 .069 .070 -.079 1 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01 two-tailed  
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TABLE 5 
Statistically Significant Binomial Logistic Regression Estimates of Economic, Competitive, 
and Structural Factors of Cities on TIF Approval and Retail TIF Approval 
with Odds Ratios (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Independent 
Variables 
TIF 
Approval  
Odds Ratio 
TIF 
Approval  
Odds Ratio 
Retail TIF 
Approval 
Odds Ratio 
Retail TIF 
Approval 
Odds Ratio 
Economic 
Development Plan 
2.94+ 
(.48) 
2.56+ 
(.46) 
  
Uses other Economic 
Development Tools 
2.74* 
(.48) 
2.49* 
(.46) 
4.10* 
(.56) 
3.56* 
(.62) 
Population in 
thousands 
 1.04+ 
(.02) 
1.03+ 
(.02) 
1.05+ 
(.02) 
Poverty Rate -1.09* 
(.04) 
-1.11* 
(.05) 
-1.11* 
(.05) 
-1.13* 
(.06) 
Unemployment Rate  1.47* 
(.18) 
1.65** 
(.19) 
1.77** 
(.20) 
Adjacent to City 
with TIF 
2.63* 
(.44) 
 2.99** 
(.45) 
 
Pseudo R 2 .21 .19 .26 .23 
LR Chi2 42.22** 37.37** 50.32** 44.28** 
N 144 144 139 139 
+ p ≤ .05 (one-tailed); * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)   
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TABLE 6 
Regression Estimates of Economic, Competitive, and Structural Factors of Cities on the Number of Total TIFs and Retail 
TIFs Approved (Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
Independent 
Variables 
Number of 
All TIFs   
Number of 
All TIFs  
Number of 
All TIFs  
Number of 
All TIFs  
Number of 
Retail TIFs  
Number of 
Retail TIFs  
Value of All 
TIFs ($)   
Value of All 
TIFs ($) 
Value of 
Retail TIFs 
($) 
Value of 
Retail TIFs 
($) 
Economic 
Development 
Plan 
.68+ 
(.35) 
.63+ 
(.37) 
        
Uses other 
Economic 
Development 
Tools 
        8,813,009* 
(4,233,996) 
8,920,285* 
(4,253,149) 
Population in 
thousands 
.03+ 
(.01) 
.03+ 
(.01) 
.03+ 
(.01) 
.03+ 
(.01) 
.02+ 
(.01) 
.02+ 
(.01) 
629,211+ 
(114,924) 
633,509+ 
(114,495) 
470,780+ 
(130,443) 
465,251+ 
(129,105) 
Percent Owner-
Occupied 
Housing 
        365,467* 
(189,503) 
356,693* 
(182,388) 
Adjacent to 
City with TIF 
1.01** 
(.34) 
 .82** 
(.30) 
 .56** 
(.21) 
     
Early Adopter  
 
 3.62** 
(.64) 
3.81** 
(.65) 
      
Constant -.73 
(1.47) 
-1.05 
(1.54) 
-1.62 
(1.33) 
-1.95 
(1.38) 
-.56 
(.89) 
-.62 
(.92) 
-34,000,000 
(24,600,000) 
-34,300,000 
(25,100,000) 
-31,600,000* 
(16,600,000) 
-32,100,000* 
(16,800,000) 
Adjusted R 2 .21 .16 .37 .33 .21 .17 .24 .24 .16 .16 
F test (10, 128) 
total 
 
4.65** 3.54** 8.22** 7.15**   4.63** 4.61**   
F test  (10, 125) 
retail 
    4.62** 3.85**   3.34** 3.34** 
N 139 139 139 139 136 136 116 116 121 121 
 
+ p ≤ .05 (one-tailed);  * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01 (two-tailed)  
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APPENDIX A 
Tax Increment Financing Survey  
 
As our communities change it is helpful to learn about the economic development tools used to ensure long-term 
growth and economic development. Your responses to this questionnaire are important for understanding the way 
tax increment financing is used as an economic development tool.  
 
Section A. General Questions 
The following are general questions about the way Tax Increment Financing (TIF) is used.  
 
1. Has the city ever approved a TIF? (PLEASE CHECK ONE)  
 No  (If no, SKIP to question 3) 
 Yes  
   
1a. If yes, how many times? _____    
AND 
    1b. What is the total value of TIFs ever awarded? __________ 
 
2. Has the city ever approved a TIF for a project that was primarily retail? (PLEASE CHECK ONE)  
 No  (If no, SKIP to question 3) 
 Yes  
   
2a. If yes, how many times? _____    
AND 
    2b. What is the total value of all retail TIFs ever awarded?__________ 
 
3. How frequently have requested TIFs been denied in the last five years? (CIRCLE A NUMBER or  
    00 if you Don’t Know)        
       Don’t Know 
0     1      2      3      4       5      6      7      8     9 10+     00 
 
 
Section B. Community Factors 
The following questions are about locus of decisions and factors that may influence the use of TIFs.  
 
4. The primary agent/office to determine the use of TIF in your community is: (PLEASE CHECK ONE) 
 chair of economic development commission   
 a formal incorporated public/private organization    
 economic development agency 
 a county government 
 city government 
 mayor  
 Don’t Know / Not sure  
 
5. Was the city in competition with other cities in the nation for the projects the TIF funds supported? (PLEASE 
CHECK ONE) 
 
 No     
 Yes, occasionally 
 Yes, always 
 Don’t Know / Not sure 
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6. Did the city compete with a nearby city for a project that used TIF funds? (PLEASE CHECK ONE) 
    No     
 Yes, occasionally 
 Yes, always 
 Don’t Know / Not sure 
 
7. Does the city have an economic development plan for the next several years? (PLEASE CHECK ONE) 
 No 
 Yes, informal/unwritten    
 Yes, formal/written  
 Don’t Know / Not sure  
 
8. Does the city “pool” sales tax revenues with other cities in the county? (PLEASE CHECK ONE) 
  No 
  Yes    
 Don’t Know / Not sure  
 
 
Section C. Economic Development Tools Use 
Municipalities have a variety of economic development tools at their disposal. Please indicate how frequently, if at 
all, your community uses the following tools.  
 
9. How many times has each of the following tools been used since 1982? 
 
  Type       Number of times used 
 Chapter 100 tax abatement       _____ 
 Chapter 353 tax abatement       _____ 
 Transportation development district (TDD)     _____ 
 Industrial development bond (IDB)      _____ 
 Other (Please Specify):______________________    _____ 
  
 
Section D. Policy Considerations 
The following questions concern decision-making processes and outcome evaluations for TIF use.  
 
10. Are there policies or guidelines governing the granting of TIFs? (PLEASE CHECK ONE)  
 No     
 Yes, formal/written    
 Yes, informal/unwritten   
 Don’t Know / Not sure  
 
11. Does the municipality evaluate cost/benefits of TIFs prior to implementation? (PLEASE CHECK ONE)  
 No     
 Yes, always      
 Yes, occasionally   
 Don’t Know / Not sure  
 
12. Is the effectiveness of TIFs evaluated on the following after implementation?  
     (PLEASE CHECK ALL THAT APPLY OR CHECK NONE OF THEM IF THE ANSWER IS NO)  
 Number of new jobs   
 Increase in tax base    
 Number of retained jobs  
 Value of investment  
 Other (Please Specify)_________  
 Don’t Know / Not sure 
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13. Are there any topics not treated in this questionnaire that you feel are important for understanding how your 
community uses TIF or other economic development tools?  If so, please provide the information below or use 
additional sheets if necessary. 
 
 
 
Thank you for your help and time in completing this survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 Note that Bartik (1991) considers moving jobs from low unemployment areas to high unemployment areas to be an 
increase in efficiency, as well. 
2
 For the 57 cities that reported their value, the average TIF was $29.8 million. 
3
 For the 48 cities that reported their value, the average retail TIF was $22.6 million. 
